Analysis On The Monitoring Mechanism Of Internal And External Property Rights Of Enterprises

According to the modern enterprise theory and the resource base view, enterprises are a series of (incomplete) contracts (nexus of incomplete contracts). It is a way to exchange property rights between the input elements of resources.

An enterprise is a set of contracts composed of different resource elements owners, which may be explicit or implicit.

Owners of different resource elements may have different preferences, capital, skills, information and endowments. Rational elements owners participate in the contracts of enterprises and contribute their resources to enterprises in an attempt to get rewards from the operation of enterprises.

At this time, the relationship between property rights and property rights of the whole enterprise is more complicated, which is beyond the scope of the ability of other elements owners directly supervised by the factor owners. Therefore, the most important feature of enterprises is the separation of ownership and control rights. Professional managers have replaced the factor owners to control the daily operation and management of enterprises, thus making the modern enterprises as a group of rational interest related parties, and the connection of property rights paction contracts is more representative.

The purpose of factor owner's entrustment of property rights is to maximize value added on the basis of value preservation of property rights, and the maximization of value of property rights on the basis of value preservation can only be achieved through the contract of enterprises.

The diversity of property rights of modern enterprises determines the tortuosity in the process of property value movement.

This is because modern enterprises, as a group of factor owners, have the contractual connection of paction property rights. The special point is that the contract contains the use of specialized human capital management talent and is understood according to the separation of the two powers.

Compared with the property rights of non human capital and its owners, the property rights of specialized human capital belong to their owners and can not be separated.

Such property rights will result in problems in the incentive mechanism for human capital.

Non human capital may be mistreated by human capital as hostage.

This determines that the modern enterprise contract can only use an incomplete contract, in other words, when the contract is signed, there is "loophole".

Precisely because

Due to the asymmetry of information and the lack of necessary control over the entrustment property rights, the realization of the maximization of the value added on the basis of value preservation can hardly be guaranteed effectively.

Therefore, factor owners need to control the entrustment property rights in order to safeguard their rights and interests.

At the same time, considering the hierarchy of modern enterprises

In order to effectively perform the responsibility of property rights, operators also need the value of property rights within the enterprise.

Implementing control to improve the efficiency of intra enterprise property rights paction.

Therefore, we believe that a complete internal control system of modern enterprises should include the supervision and control mechanism mentioned above by the principal to the agent and the mechanism for the agent to report to the client effectively.

At the same time, it must also include bargaining power and other related factors that affect their behavioral capacity.

However, the interest relationship between the principal and the agent is interactive and symbiotic, because both parties are actually pursuing the goal of maximizing the value of property on the basis of preserving value on the basis of their input into the enterprise, and the realization of this goal must pay a certain amount of information cost.

However, due to the large number of factor owners, the value orientation of owners will inevitably conflict with each other.

In order to make up for the incompleteness of the enterprise and protect the legitimate interests of the owners of the elements from being illegally captured by other factor owners, balancing and coordinating the value orientation of the owners of the elements, this requires a certain mechanism of management, control and supervision to ensure the smooth realization of the above goals. That is to say, the construction of the internal control system becomes the fundamental starting point for all the factor owners to sign "contracts" to make up for the loopholes in the enterprise contracts.

Because of the absolute asymmetry of information, coupled with the complexity of the real world, the bounded rationality of economic people and the influence of opportunism, this contract is inherently incompleteness.